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ABSTRACT
Online recommendation systems make use of a variety of informa-
tion sources to provide users the items that users are potentially
interested in. However, due to the openness of the online platform,
recommendation systems are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks.
Existing attack approaches are either based on simple heuristic
rules or designed against specific recommendations approaches.
The former often suffers unsatisfactory performance, while the
latter requires strong knowledge of the target system. In this pa-
per, we focus on a general next-item recommendation setting and
propose a practical poisoning attack approach named LOKI against
blackbox recommendation systems. The proposed LOKI utilizes the
reinforcement learning algorithm to train the attack agent, which
can be used to generate user behavior samples for data poison-
ing. In real-world recommendation systems, the cost of retraining
recommendation models is high, and the interaction frequency be-
tween users and a recommendation system is restricted. Given these
real-world restrictions, we propose to let the agent interact with
a recommender simulator instead of the target recommendation
system and leverage the transferability of the generated adversarial
samples to poison the target system. We also propose to use the
influence function to efficiently estimate the influence of injected
samples on the recommendation results, without re-training the
models within the simulator. Extensive experiments on two datasets
against four representative recommendation models show that the
proposed LOKI achieves better attacking performance than existing
methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, one of the fundamental challenges for web
users is information overload, because of which users struggle in
locating the information they indeed need. Recommendation sys-
tems, which suggest items (e.g., movies, products, music, etc.) that
are likely to interest users based on their historical behaviors, are
proposed to alleviate the information overload issue. Nowadays,
recommendation systems are widely deployed by Web service plat-
forms (e.g., YouTube, Amazon, and Taobao) and play an important
role in guiding users to make decisions and choices.
It is commonly assumed that online recommendation systems
are honorable and unbiased. They recommend users the items that
match their personal interests. However, the openness of recom-
mendation systems and the potential benefit of manipulating rec-
ommendation systems offer both opportunities and incentives for
malicious parties to launch attacks. Recent studies [11, 13, 16, 18, 23]
have demonstrated that recommendation systems are vulnerable
to poisoning attacks. In these poisoning attacks, well-crafted data
is injected into the training set of a recommendation system by a
group of malicious users. Such poisoning attacks make the system
deliver recommendations as attackers desire.
Existing poisoning attacks can be categorized into two types.
The first type of work is generally based on manually designed
heuristic rules. For example, [18] design rules that leverage the fol-
lowing intuition: items that are usually selected together by users
are treated as highly correlated by recommendation systems. To
promote a target item to target users, attackers utilize controlled
users to fake the co-occurrence between the target item and popular
items. Nevertheless, such heuristic rules are not able to cover vari-
ous patterns of behavior in the recommendation data. Therefore,
the performances of these attackmethods are usually unsatisfactory.
The other line of methods are designed for certain types of recom-
mendation methods like matrix factorization based models [13].
However, the architecture and the parameters of the recommenda-
tion systems in real-world platforms are generally unknown to the
attackers. Usually, the only information that the attackers can rely
on to infer the characteristics of the recommendation systems is
the recommendation results of the users they controlled, and the
frequency of these interactions is often limited. Thus, there is still
a noticeable gap before these attacks methods can be deployed in
real practice.
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In this work, we propose a novel practical adversarial attack
framework against sophisticated blackbox recommendation sys-
tems. We focus on one of the most common next-item recommenda-
tion setting, which aims to recommend top-K potentially preferred
items for each user. The proposed reinforcement learning based
framework LOKI learns an attack agent to generate adversarial
user behavior sequences for data poisoning attacks. Unlike exist-
ing attack methods designed for certain types of recommendation
methods, reinforcement learning algorithms can utilize the feed-
back from the recommendation systems, instead of comprehensive
knowledge of architecture and parameters, to learn the agent’s pol-
icy. Nevertheless, in practice, the attacker cannot control the target
recommendation system to be retrained to get the feedback and
update the attack strategy. In addition, recommendation system
service providers generally restrict feedback frequency, but a rein-
forcement learning based framework requires a large number of
feedback to train a policy function. Due to this discrepancy, we can-
not directly rely on the feedback from the target recommendation
system to train a policy within a tolerated time period.
To tackle this challenge, we propose to construct a local rec-
ommender simulator to imitate the target model, and let the rein-
forcement framework get reward feedback from the recommender
simulator instead of the target recommendation system. The local
recommender simulator is constructed by constructing an ensemble
of multiple representative recommendation models. The intuition
behind such a design is that if two recommenders can both get
similar recommendation results on a given dataset, then the adver-
sarial samples generated for one of the recommenders can be used
to attack the other. Such transferability makes the recommender
simulator a good substitute for the target recommendation system
in terms of guiding the attack agent. Moreover, even with the help
of a local simulator, it is still time-consuming to retrain the recom-
mendation systems within the simulator using the contaminated
data for attack outcome. To alleviate this problem, we design a
component named outcome estimator, which is based on the in-
fluence function. The outcome estimator can efficiently estimate
the influence of the injected adversarial samples on the attack out-
comes. These designs ensure that the proposed adversarial attack
framework for recommendation systems is practical and effective.
In the experiments, we adopt representative recommendation
models as targets and conduct attacks on a real-world dataset to
evaluate the proposed poisoning attack framework. Experimental
results show that the proposed LOKI outperforms baseline attack
methods. We also provide further analysis of the factors that influ-
ence the attack outcome.
2 THREAT MODEL
To facilitate the discussions in the rest of this paper, we specify and
formulate the next-item recommendation task as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Next Item Recommendation). LetU be the set of
users and V be the set of items, we use xu = [x1u ,x2u , · · · ,xmuu ]
to denote a sequence of items that user u has chosen before in a
chronological order in which xvu ⊆ V .mu denotes the number of
items chosen by user u. Given existing sequences, the goal of the
next-item recommendation is to output a K-sized ordered item list,
which predicts the next item that the user will choose.
With the aforementioned definition, let us detail the threat model
of the attack against the next-item recommendation.
Attack Goal: An attacker’s goal is to promote a set of target
items to as many target users as possible. Specifically, suppose the
system recommends K items to each user, the attacker’s goal is to
maximize averaged display rate, which denotes the fraction of target
users whose top-K recommendations results include the target items.
Note that an attacker could also demote a target item. Demotion can
be viewed as a special case of promotion as an attacker can promote
other items such that the target item is demoted in recommendation
lists. Thus, in this paper, we focus on promotion attacks.
Attack Approach: To achieve the attack goal, we consider the
most general scenario in which the attackers can inject controlled
users into the recommendation system. These controlled users visit
or rate to well-selected items, which are named as proxy items, step-
by-step. Thus, the well-crafted activities of each controlled user
form a behavior sequence. To make the injection unnoticeable, the
number of visits or ratings each controlled user conducts is limited
to at mostM .
The Knowledge and Capability of the Attacker: In this pa-
per, we assume that the attacker is granted the following knowledge
and capability.
(1) The attacker can access the full activity history of all the
users in the recommendation system.
(2) The attacker has limited resources so the attacker can merely
inject a limited number of controlled users which can easily
be bought from the underground market1.
(3) The attacker does not know the details about the target
recommendation system, for instance, the parameters and
the architecture of the recommendation model. Such setting
is also known as blackbox setting.
(4) The attacker can only receive a limited number of feed-
back (e.g., display rates) from the blackbox recommendation
model.
(5) The attacker does NOT know when the target blackbox rec-
ommendation model is retrained.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first provide an overview of the proposed rein-
forcement learning based framework. Then we describe the detailed
design of each component of the framework.
3.1 Framework Overview
Intuitively, data poisoning can be regarded as the creation of new
sequential patterns that involve the target items in the training set
of the target recommendation system. In a crafted sequential adver-
sarial sample, the user behavior history is inherently crucial in de-
termining the next behavior. These sequential adversarial samples
together contribute to the manipulation goal. Generating adversar-
ial samples is essentially a multi-step decision process, in which the
generator ought to select specific actions for the controlled users
to maximize attack outcome. This fits the reinforcement learning
setting. From the perspective of reinforcement learning, the goal is
to learn a policy function to generate sequential adversarial user
1 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/amazon-marketplace-sellers-
black-hat-scams-search-rankings
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed framework LOKI.
behavior samples, which can maximize the averaged display rate
of the target users.
Based on the aforementioned motivation, we propose a rein-
forcement learning based framework to learn the policy function.
The overall architecture of the proposed framework LOKI is illus-
trated in Figure 1. The target blackbox recommendation system is
deployed on an e-commerce platform. The proposed framework con-
sists of three components: (1) recommender simulator, (2) outcome
estimator, and (3) adversarial sample generator. In the following
sections, we describe the details of these components one-by-one.
3.2 Recommender Simulator
The idea of constructing surrogate models and utilizing the transfer-
ability property of adversarial samples to attack the target machine
learning models is adopted by multiple attack approaches [3, 7, 19].
In this paper, the proposed recommender simulator simulates the
recommendation preference of the target model. The simulator
consists of multiple separated recommendation models, which are
trained on the same dataset. Recommendation results from these
models are aggregated via weighted voting. Suppose M different
recommendation models are deployed to recommend items for user
u and the rank of item i in them-th model is denoted as rankm (i).
The higher item i ranks, the smaller rankm (i) is. Here, we define the
preference score of item i in the simulator via Eq. (1). All the items
are then ranked according to this scoring function:
score(i) = − 1
M
M∑
m=1
wm · rankm (i), (1)
wherewm stands for the weight of them-th recommendationmodel.
Ideally, these weights are used to adjust the simulator to match the
characteristics of the target recommender.
3.3 Outcome Estimator
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we need to utilize the manipulation
outcome of the current adversarial samples as reward feedback to
update the policy network of the adversarial sample generator. The
most straightforward way to obtain the outcome is to retrain the en-
tire model. However, retraining the online recommendation system
is prohibitively slow (from a few hours to days for a single retrain-
ing). To make the attack methodology practical, we propose to use
influence function for an efficient estimation of the manipulation
outcome, motivated by robust statistics.
Formally speaking, the parameter estimator of the recommenda-
tion models on the clean dataset is: θˆ := argminθ 1N
∑N
i=1 L(zi ;θ ),
where θ denotes the parameter vector,L stands for the loss function
of the recommendation model. zi denotes a sample in the dataset,
and N stands for the total number of samples in the training set.
For collaborative filtering models, a sample is a single user-item
pair (u,v). For session-based recommendation models, given the
behavior sequence xu = [x1u ,x2u , · · · ,xmu ] of a user u, each training
sample is made up of a subsequence and the ground truth next item,
i.e., ([x1u ],x2u ), ([x1u ,x2u ],x3u ), · · · , ([x1u ,x2u , · · · ,xn−1u ],xnu ).
Now let us move on to the discussion of the influence function.
Supposewe upweight a sample zδ by a small ϵ in the training set, the
new estimation of θ is given as: θˆzδ := argminθ 1N
∑N
i=1 L(zi ;θ )+
ϵL(zδ ;θ ). When ϵ → 0, according to the classic results in [6], the
influence of upweighting zδ on the parameter θ is given by:
dθˆzδ
dϵ
= θˆzδ − θˆ ≈ −H−1θˆ ∇θL(zδ ; θˆ ), (2)
where Hθˆ :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 ∇2θL(zi ,θ ), denotes the Hessian matrix of
the loss function. Given the fact that the number of users is large in
the recommendation datasets, injecting a data sample is the same
as upweighting the sample by ϵ ≈ 1N .
Here, the key computation bottleneck lies in the calculation
of the huge inverse Hessian matrix H−1θ . Given a sample zj , we
use implicit Hessian-vector products (HVPs) [1, 10] to efficiently
approximate −H−1θ ∇θL(zj , θˆ ).
Based on an approximate estimate of the sample upweight’s
influence on parameter θˆ , we further calculate the influence on
the prediction scoring function w.r.t. the perturbation. Specifically,
suppose we want to promote an product v ′ to user u ′, we can treat
this as a target sample ztestu′v ′ in the test set. The influence on the
prediction scoring function w.r.t. can be written as:
d ftest (ztestu′v ′ ; θˆ )
dϵ
=
d ftest (ztestu′v ′ ; θˆ )
dθˆzδ
· dθˆzδ
dϵ
≈ − ∇θ ftest (ztestu′v ′ ; θˆ )H−1θˆ ∇θL(zδ ; θˆ ),
(3)
where ftest is the prediction scoring function used by the recom-
mender system in the test phase. This result is further used to design
rewards for efficient agent policy training.
3.4 Adversarial Sample Generator
The adversarial attack against a local recommender simulator is
essentially interpreted as a multi-step decision problem. In this
section, we translate this decision problem into a Markov Decision
Process (MDP).MDP is defined as a tuple (S,A,P,R,γ ), whereS is
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Figure 2: Generation of adversarial samples.
a set of states,A is a set of actions, P is the transition probabilities,
R is the immediate reward, and γ is the discount factor. In the
context of this paper, the MDP can be specified as follows:
• Action space A: As mentioned in Section 3.1, the attacker
determines specific items organized in a proper sequence for
each controlled user. Instead of taking the set of all the possi-
ble items as action space, we divide the item set into groups
and use the set of all the groups as action space. The main
reason for using coarse groups instead of items for action
space is due to the concern in learning efficiency. Learning
action strategies for every single item is not only costly but
also unnecessary for the attack goal. This is because adver-
sarial samples do not need to follow the exact sample pattern.
Here we define one of the groups as the collection of all the
target items, one of the groups as the collection of all the
items already selected by the target users. The remaining
groups are obtained by item clustering, in which each group
represents items with similar properties. This item clustering
takes the feature vectors of all the items and an integer c as
input and divides the items into c clusters. Here, we utilize
non-negative matrix factorization [12] to extract item fea-
tures and use K-means [14] algorithm for clustering. After
item groups are obtained, during the phases of training and
testing the agent, group-level actions are sampled step-by-
step from the policy, forming a group-level action sequence.
Then sequential poisoning samples are sampled step-by-step
from the corresponding group indicated by the current step
of the group-level action sequence. This process is illustrated
in Figure 2. The left side of Figure 2 shows the process of
clustering items into groups and the right side illustrates the
process of generating the poisoning samples.
• StateS: The state is defined as the action subsequence before
current step t and the actions all come from the action space
mentioned above.
• RewardR: As aforementioned, the purpose of the attacker is
to manipulate the local recommender simulator and further
the target recommender. Hence, the RL framework should
learn a policy that promotes the estimated prediction scores
of target items given by the target users as much as possi-
ble. Thus, we design the reward as the weighted averaged
influence on the prediction scoring function, i.e., Eq. (3), of all
the target samples. The weights are assigned manually to
indicate the importance of each recommendation simulator.
Here, we apply Deep Q-Network (DQN) to estimate the action-
value function. The representation of the existing sequence, i.e.,
state, is modeled via a GRU (Gated Recurrent Unit) layer, and the
representation of each type of actions is extracted via a embedding
layer. Finally, we deploy a fully connect layer which takes the final
output of the GRU layer as input and output the estimated action-
values.
The DQN is trained via an iterative algorithm. In each iteration,
there are two stages, replay memory generation stage and param-
eters update stage. In replay memory generation stage, the agent
generates a group-level action at according to an ϵ-greedy policy
and current state st . Then the item-level sequences are generated
by sampling items from the corresponding group suggested by each
step in the group-level sequence. After that, the agent observes the
reward rt from the outcome estimator and updates the state. For
parameter update stage: the agent samples a (st ,at , rt , st+1) from
replay memory, and then updates the parameters.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we test the proposed LOKI on real against different
recommendation methods. The experimental results show that the
proposed method outperforms existing attack strategies. Besides,
we systematically study the effect of some key factors.
4.1 Datasets
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed poisoning attack
framework, we adopt the Amazon Beauty, which is one category of
the widely used recommendation dataset series named Amazon [8].
The dataset used in this paper mainly focuses on hair and skin care
products and is extracted from large corpora of product reviews
crawled from Amazon.com. The number of users and items in the
dataset are 22,363 and 12,101, respectively. The number of total
user activities (i.e., purchase and review) is 146,031. On average,
each user is involved in 6.53 activities and each item is involved in
12.06 activities. We followed the similar preprocessing procedure
introduced in [9, 22] and filter out the users with less than five
activities and items with less than five feedbacks.
4.2 Experimental Settings
4.2.1 Baseline Attack Methods. As aforementioned, there is no
existing work solving exactly the same task considered in this paper.
Although there are some existing attack approaches [13] against
recommendation methods, they are mostly designed for whitebox
setting and require a strong knowledge of the architecture and
parameters of the corresponding model. Therefore, these methods
cannot be used in the blackbox setting discussed in this paper. Hence,
we compare the proposed LOKI with several existing heuristic-
based attack strategies.
• None: This denotes the circumstance when no attack is
conducted.
• Random: In this baseline method, the attacker mixes the
target items and the randomly picked items to form a reposi-
tory for each controlled account. In each step, the controlled
user picks items at random from the item repository without
repetition.
• Popular: This is a variant of [23]. In this baseline method,
attackers inject fake co-visitations between the popular items
and the target items, to promote the target items.
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4.2.2 Target RecommendationMethods. In this section, we consider
the following target methods for performance comparisons. The
parameters of these target methods are set following the suggestion
in the original papers.
• BPRMF [20] is a factorization based personalized ranking
approach. It is a state-of-the-art method for non-sequential
item recommendation on implicit feedback data.
• FPMC [21] is a classic hybrid model combing Markov chain
and matrix factorization for next-basket recommendation.
FPMC can model the user’s long-term preference and the
short-term item-to-item transition.
For each user u in the dataset, suppose the length of u’s sequence is
Tu , we hold the first Tu − 2 actions in the sequence as the training
set and use the next one action as the validation set to search for
the optimal hyperparameter settings for these recommendation
models. The attack methods aim to manipulate the prediction of
the next item, i.e. item Tu .
To simulate the interactions between the target blackbox recom-
mendation system and the recommender simulator, we adopt the
“leave-one-out strategy”. That is to say we use a specific recommen-
dation model as the target, which is blind to the attacker, and use
the aggregation of all the methods as the recommender simulator.
The number of target items and target users in this paper are both
fixed to be 20.
4.2.3 Evaluation Metric. We use the averaged display rate, which
denotes the fraction of target users whose top-K recommendation
results include the target items, as our evaluation metric. The larger
the display rate is, the better the attack approach performs.
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Figure 3: Overall performance of all the attack methods.
(Best viewed with color).
4.3 Result Analysis
Figure 3 summarizes the results for all the attack methods. Here,
we fix the percentage of controlled users to 3% and the number of
actions per user to 15. The number of returned items is fixed to
10. In terms of attack outcome, the proposed LOKI achieves the
best performance and the improvement is significant. For example,
on compared with the best baseline, the proposed LOKI ’s display
rate increases by over eight times on average. Among the baseline
methods, Random simply lets the target items occur in the poisoning
sequences without actually creating any new pattern that favors
the recommendation of the target items. Thus, Random has the
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Figure 4: Impact of the percentage of the controlled users.
(Best viewed with color).
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Figure 5: Impact of the number of activities per controlled
user. (Best viewed with color).
worst performance. Popular fakes the co-visitations between the
popular items and the target items without considering whether
these popular items indeed overlap with the preferences of the
target users. Thus, they cannot get a satisfactory performance too.
Compared with these baselines, the proposed LOKI takes ad-
vantage of the feedback from the local simulator to train an attack
agent. The learned agent is capable of creating more complex pat-
terns to achieve data poisoning goals. We also notice that the more
complicated the target model is, the higher increase in performance
metric the proposed LOKI achieves. For instance, the performance
gap is larger when attacking FPMC than attacking BPRMF. This is
because advanced methods are able to capture more complicated
user patterns within user behavior sequences. The capability to cap-
ture various user patterns leads to better prediction performance
in general, but at the same time, enables more room for the attack
improvement by the proposed LOKI with its ability of creating new
patterns to poison the recommendation. That is to say, in some
circumstances, the proposed LOKI can create certain sequential
patterns. However, since relatively simple methods cannot cap-
ture these crafted patterns, these methods are less sensitive to the
adversarial samples generated by the proposed LOKI.
4.4 Parameter Analysis
After discussing the overall experimental results and the charac-
teristics of vulnerable users, we demonstrate the impact of two
attack budgets, i.e. (1) the percentage of controlled users recruited
by the attacker; (2) the number of activities that each controlled
user conducts.
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havior samples before and after the injection on Amazon
Beauty dataset. (Best viewed with color).
Impact of the Percentage of the Controlled Users. In this
experiment, we consider the case where the percentage of the
controlled user is low, and evaluate the performance of LOKI when
this percentage is varied. Here “percentage” is calculated as the
number of the controlled users over the number of normal users.
The number of activities per controlled user is fixed to 15 and the
recommendation system returns top 10 items. The display rate for
the real-world datasets is shown in Figure 4. From the figure, we can
clearly see that the proposed LOKI outperforms the baselines in all
cases and can successfully promote the target items. For instance,
when attacking against FPMC, the display rate increases to 0.055
even when the percentage of the controlled users is as low as 3%.
Thus, we can conclude that the attack proposed in this paper is
effective even with a scant attack budget.
Impact of theNumber ofActivities perControlledUser.When
the percentage of controlled users is given, the number of activities
each controlled user conducts is another important attack factor.
In this experiment, we fix the percentage of the controlled users
to be 3% and vary the number of activities each controlled user
conducts from 5 to 15 for all the datasets. The recommendation
system returns top 10 items. The results are shown in Figure 5.
These results show that the proposed LOKI outperforms the base-
line methods in all cases. With the number of activities per user
increasing, the display rates also increase. This is because a larger
number of activities grant the controlled users more capability to
inject the manipulated bias information to the system. If we look at
the distribution of the length sequential user behavior samples in
the Amazon dataset, for example, the distribution derived from the
dataset in Figure 6, we can see that the distributions before and after
the injection are similar. Hence, injecting such generated sequential
samples into the dataset is unnoticeable from the perspective of the
online platform operators in practice.
5 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we survey the relatedwork from two aspects: general
data poisoning attacks and poisoning attacks against recommenda-
tion systems.
Data Poisoning Attacks: Data poisoning attacks against ma-
chine learning algorithms have become an important research topic
in the field of adversarial machine learning. This type of attack takes
place during the training stage of machine learning models. The
attacker tries to contaminate the training data by injecting well-
designed samples to force a nefarious model on the learner. Data
poisoning attacks have been studied against a wide range of learn-
ing systems including SVM [4] neural networks [10, 17], latent
Dirichlet allocation [15], matrix factorization-based collaborative
filtering [13] and autoregressive models [2, 5]. Existing work has
almost exclusively focused on (1) whitebox settings, where the at-
tacker observes the model architecture; (2) continuous data like
image or acoustic data. In this paper, we focus on amore challenging
blackbox setting, where the attacker does not know the architecture
or the parameter of the target model. Instead, the attacker is merely
given scant implicit feedback from the target model.
PoisoningRecommendation Systems: Similar to general data
poisoning attacks, poisoning recommendation systems aims to
spoof a recommendation system via injecting adversarial samples,
such that the system recommends as the attacker desires. The first
study on poisoning recommendation systems [18] was carried out
more than a decade ago. In early work, the proposed attacks are
usually heuristics-driven. For instance, in random attacks [11], the
attacker randomly selects some items for each injected controlled
user and then generates a rating score for each selected item from a
normal distribution, whose mean and variance are the same as those
of the uncontaminated dataset. These methods rely on user-item
ratings which do not exist in the next-item recommendation setting.
Poisoning attacks [13, 23] that were proposed recently generate
fake behavior that is optimized according to a particular type of rec-
ommendation system. Specifically, Li et al. [13] proposed poisoning
attacks for matrix-factorization-based recommendation systems.
Yang et al. [23] proposed poisoning attacks for association-rule-
based recommendation systems, in which each user injects fake
co-visitations between items instead of fake rating scores of items.
Unlike these methods, the framework proposed in this paper does
not require the details of the target system as prior knowledge.
Hence, the proposed framework can be used in a broader spectrum
of contexts.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose a data poisoning attack against blackbox
next-item recommendation system. The poisoning attack problem
is formulated as amulti-step decision problem and is solved via deep
reinforcement learning method. In practice, this task could be fur-
ther complicated by the huge scale of recommendation dataset, the
costly training time, and the access restrictions of real recommen-
dation systems. The proposed framework leverages the influence
approximation technique and the recommender simulator. Experi-
mental results indicate that the proposed framework consistently
outperforms all the baselines in terms of promoting the target items
to the target users. We also study the impact of different factors on
the poisoning results. In the future, we will investigate the defense
strategies against the vulnerability discussed in this paper.
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